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KOSOVA: THE BALKAN POWDER KEG

With its indecision and hesitation, the international community has failed miserably in containing Serbia's expansionist designs and ending the bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Having occupied about 70 percent of Bosnia's territory and in the process causing destruction and committing atrocities unheard of since World War II, the Serbs have practically achieved their objectives. Short of Western military intervention or the massive arming of the forces of the Sarajevo government, it seems highly improbable that Serbian gains in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be reserved. The world's impotence in dealing with what is generally recognised as Serbian aggression and the Geneva Peace Conference's attempts to finesse a convenient end to the conflict that will solidify Serbian territorial gains in Bosnia have set a dangerous precedent, possibly whetting the appetite of Serbia's strong man Slobodan Milosevic for further territorial conquest. Having shrunk from the hazards of military action in Bosnia, the world is now faced with the real danger of a wider Balkan war as Milosevic persists in his policy of aggression and brutality in an attempt to create a Greater Serbia from the ashes of Yugoslavia, threatening to engulf the Balkans in general anarchy.

Milosevic's reelection and the strong gains shown by the ultranationalists in the Serbian elections of 20 December 1992 have increased the chances of the war spreading south into Kosova (Kosovo), a formerly autonomous province and a federal unit of Yugoslavia where ethnic Albanians account for about 92 percent of the population, as well as into the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, where ethnic Albanians make up between 30 and 40 percent of the population. There are disturbing signs that, after Bosnia, Serbia will turn its attention to Kosova.

Tensions in Kosova, which has been under martial law since Milosevic abolished its autonomy in 1989, are higher than ever before. The Serbian authorities have stationed massive forces in Kosova, numbering about 30 000 troops and 25 000 heavily-armed police¹.

Local Serbs, numbering eight percent of the population of Kosova, have been armed. Moreover, Serbian paramilitary units roam freely throughout the region, intimidating ethnic Albanians. Serbian warplanes regularly fly over the Kosova capital of Prishtina (Pristina), and Serb militias man roadblocks throughout Kosova. Thousands of Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia are being resettled in Kosova as part of a program designed to tilt the balance of the population's ethnic structure away from the Albanians.

Following the abolition of Kosova's autonomy, ethnic Albanians refused to accept the legitimacy of Serbian rule, proclaimed Kosova an independent republic, and elected as president Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Kosova Democratic Alliance (LDK) and a strong advocate of a peaceful strategy to resolve the Albanian-Serbian conflict. The Albanians have established a shadow government and parallel administrative institutions.

Continued repression, combined with ethnic rivalry, unfavorable socioeconomic conditions, very high unemployment, and widespread frustration and resentment among the Albanians have led to a highly volatile situation². Rugova has called on the United Nations to send peacekeeping troops to Kosova and has urged Serbian leaders to open talks aimed at a peaceful resolution of the conflict. President Sali Berisha of Albania has said that the international community must prevent Serbia from engaging in ethnic cleansing in Kosova³.

The international community, whose response in the past to Serbian repression in Kosova has been scandalously inadequate, has warned Serbia against any attempt at the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosova. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner has said that any extension of the fighting to Kosova and a Balkan war must be "stopped at all costs"⁴. Former president George Bush warned the Serbian leadership last December that the United States would use force if Serbia were to extend the war to Kosova. Bush's message reportedly said that, "in the event of conflict in Kosova caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosova and in Serbia proper"⁵.

It remains unclear whether Milosevic will heed these warnings, given the international community's lamentable refusal to mount concerted action against Serbian aggression in Bosnia. However, it is clear that the spread of the war to Kosova would draw in not only Albania and Macedonia, but also Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. Given the currently inflammable atmosphere, there is a danger of Kosova exploding even if Milosevic heeds these warnings, because a simple incident could ignite a chain of events leading to war, with far-reaching repercussions for stability in Europe. Unless the international community takes serious preventive measures in Kosova, the outlook for the Balkans is exceptionally gloomy, and it is highly probable that war will spread.

From an Autonomous Province to a Colony

Despite recurring tensions, Albanians and Serbs have managed to coexist in Kosova without large-scale intercommunal violence. The conflict has not so much been a struggle between the two peoples as between the Serbian authorities and the Albanian masses.

The conflict simmered until 1981, when the Yugoslav Government used force to suppress ethnic Albanian demonstrations, starting a 12 year period of repression and violence. In March and April 1981, in the first major nationalist disturbances of the post-Tito period, tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians demanded that Kosova "be proclaimed a republic on a par with Yugoslavia's other republics with the theoretical right to secede from the federation"⁶.

The authorities responded with a military crackdown and a policy of repression that was extended to the Albanians in Montenegro and especially in Macedonia, where the Skopje authorities abolished Albanian-language secondary education, restricted the use of the Albanian language in public life, demolished traditional walls surrounding Albanian houses, and tried to limit by administrative means the high birth rate among ethnic Albanians.

The unrest in Kosova led to a rapid and dramatic growth in Serbian nationalism. Complaining that Serbia had not received its fair share in Tito's

Yugoslavia, Serbian nationalists demanded the restoration of control over Kosova and Vojvodina, the other autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia, and advocated new arrangements to better reflect the Serbian nation's "legitimate" interests in the federation. Slobodan Milosevic became leader of the ruling Serbian Communist Party, now the Socialist Party, in 1986, and pinned his political fortunes on restoring Serbian control of Kosova and putting an end to the alleged Albanian persecution of local Serbs and Montenegrins. Identifying the Albanians as the national enemies of Serbia and Yugoslavia, Milosevic accused them of genocide against the Slavs and on attempting to unite with Albania. In his campaign, he relied heavily on the Belgrade media, which presented a distorted picture of Albanian demands and of the general situation in the province.

With the help of massive demonstrations by Serbs and Montenegrins, Milosevic intimidated the federal leadership into giving him a free hand in Kosova. Abandoning Tito's policy of autonomy for the ethnic Albanians, Milosevic embarked on frivolous, unpredictable, and provocative measures, even threatening the ethnic Albanians with war. According to a report by Helsinki Watch, Milosevic "embarked on a programme to disenfranchise and marginalise the ethnic Albanians in ways constituting racism, impermissible ethnic discrimination, and a grave violation of the rights of ethnic Albanians to free expression and equal political participation"⁷.

Demonstration of Democracy

Although ethnic Albanian Communist leaders had made half-hearted attempts to preserve Kosova's quasi-republican status, Milosevic succeeded, with Kosova under a state of emergency, in pushing laws through the provincial and republican parliaments that eliminated Koaoca's autonomy in March 1989. The Albanian population took to the streets and the ensuing weeklong clashes between the unarmed population and the security forces left 25 people dead and 228 seriously injured⁸. Further unrest took place in early 1990: tens of thousands of Albanians staged peaceful demonstrations in Prishtina on 23 and 24 January demanding parliamentary democracy, the release of all political prisoners, and an end to political trials. The authorities used force to disperse the demonstrators. For the next month, security forces clashed with Albanian demonstrators throughout the province. Belgrade acknowledged that at least 34 people were killed and hundreds were injured⁹.

Milosevic's policy toward Kosova aimed at breaking the ethnic Albanians' will to resist Serbian domination. It combined extreme Serbian nationalism, the use of coercion, fear, and intimidation, the general disenfranchisement of the Albanians, and the use of propaganda to demonise them. Having restored Serbia's control over Kosova, Milosevic embarked on a policy of Serbianising the province through deliberately marginalising the Albanians economically and socially. In an extensive campaign to ethnically cleanse the bureaucracy, Albanians in leading positions in all fields were replaced by Serbs, most of them coming directly from Serbia. More than 100 000 Albanian workers lost their jobs, and many were also evicted from their apartments. An ambitious plan to resettle Serbs in Kosova was announced. Serbs agreeing to work there were offered various advantages, including higher wages and free housing. New factories were built in areas populated solely by Serbs and Montenegrins. Serbia also initiated a policy of cultural disenfranchisement, closing

down the Albanian university, excluding thousands of Albanian high-school graduates from further education, with holding funds from Albanian educational institutions, debarring Albanian national themes from the curriculum, and imposing Serbian educational programmes.

Already Yugoslavia's poorest region, with a per capita income one-fourth of the country's average, Kosova was plunged into a deep economic crisis. Many Kosovars were threatened by what amounted to a man-made famine. Several hundred thousand Albanians were forced to emigrate from the province¹⁰. The Serbs actively encouraged the mass emigration of the Albanians in the hope of changing the province's ethnic composition. Moreover, the exodus served as a safety valve for seething ethnic tensions.

By the summer of 1990, even Serbia's friends in Kosova had turned against Milosevic. On 2 July, Albanian members of the provincial parliament, most of them members of the League of Communists who had until then supported Serbia's policies, declared Kosova an independent unit within the Yugoslav Federation¹¹. Three days later, the Serbian Government responded by taking over full control of the province and suspending the local parliament and government. Moreover, in an effort to restrict the expression of independent views in the Kosova media and to forestall attacks on official Serbian policy, the Albanian-language television and radio stations were closed down, as was Rilindja, the only Albanian-language daily newspaper in Yugoslavia. 1 300 journalists lost their jobs¹². The Albanian-language media has adopted a critical stance to Serbia's crackdown in Kosova, publicising the views of the emerging opposition, and broaching sensitive subjects hitherto considered taboo.

The Republic of Kosova

On 7 September 1990, Albanian members of the suspended Kosova Assembly met clandestinely in the town of Kacanik and proclaimed Kosova a republic. Kosovar lawmakers approved a Constitution, which states that "The Republic of Kosova is a democratic state of the Albanian people and of the members of other nations and national minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Montenegrins, Croats, Turks, Romanies, and other living in Kosova... The Republic of Kosova as a state is part of the Yugoslav community"¹³. Predictably, Belgrade responded by calling the Kacanik declaration an unconstitutional act and a direct attack on the territorial integrity of both Serbia and Yugoslavia. The authorities arrested several members of the Kosova Assembly, while the remainder fled to Croatia, Slovenia, or foreign countries in order to avoid arrest. Zenun Celaj, a prominent journalist and secretary of the Prishtina-based Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, was jailed for one month. Celaj was the only journalist present at the Kacanik meeting¹⁴.

The Yugoslav federal government, which during Tito's time had tried to strike a balance between the irreconcilable aspirations of the Albanians and the Serbs by granting Kosova autonomy but keeping it within Serbia was by 1990 unwilling or unable to prevent the open expression of the strong anti-Albanian feelings of the Serbian nationalists. The collective presidency became anything but an honest broker, endorsing Serbia's abolition of Kosova's self-government. Meanwhile, the western republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina failed to take any tangible action to block Serbia's move and merely played the role of concerned spectators. Only when it became obvious that Milosevic wished to restructure the whole federation did Ljubljana and Zagreb criticise Serbia's total disregard for the rule of law in Kosova

and belatedly express support for the beleaguered Albanians. By now it was too late: Milosevic had achieved his stated objectives in Kosova and had in the process destroyed the 1974 Constitution.

Western governments likewise deplored Milosevic's conduct, but failed to do so in strong terms. The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament censured the Serbian Government's violations of human rights, but the U.S. and Western European governments rejected calls for economic sanctions to persuade Yugoslavia and Serbia to abide by international standards of human rights.

Albanian Homogenisation

By depriving the Albanians of their security, their basic human livelihood, and their part in the political process, Milosevic had brought conflict nearer. The Serbian Government justified its actions by claiming they were necessary to protect the Serbian and Montenegrin minority in Kosova.

Although many Albanians were traumatised by Serbian pressure and psychological terror, Milosevic's policy of blatant colonialism also provoked an unprecedented growth in Albanian political activism. Albanians throughout Yugoslavia came together in a process of ethnic homogenisation and spiritual rebirth that created a new social cohesion. The overwhelming solidarity among the ranks of Albanians not only in Kosova but in Montenegro and Macedonia was perhaps best illustrated by a campaign launched by students and prominent intellectuals in February 1990 to put an end to the age-old custom of the blood-feud that had survived in Kosova. By appealing to patriotic instincts and emphasizing the need for unity in the face of renewed Serbian repression, Albanian activists resolved the vast majority of blood feuds within the space of a few months.

The Emergence of an Organised Opposition

By the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990, as the ruling League of Communists lost all support among the Albanians, the Kosovar political scene underwent rapidly a dramatic change with the emergence of the first independent and noncommunist political parties. In December 1989, a group of intellectuals who had vociferously denounced the abolition of Kosova's autonomy formed the Kosova Democratic League (LDK), which emerged within months as the most important Albanian opposition party. The prominent literary critic Ibrahim Rugova was elected LDK chairman. In its initial programme, the LDK called for full autonomy for Kosova but stopped short of demanding republican status. It also called for free elections and the establishment of a multiparty system and a free market economy. The LDK, which by 1991 claimed over 700 000 members, was followed by other parties, the most important being the Peasant Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Parliamentary Party, and the Christian Democratic Party.

The Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro also established their own political parties and pressed demands for autonomy. The Kosovar opposition parties coordinated their activities and took a common stand on key issues.

The unintended effect of Milosevic's policies was that by the end of 1990 the Albanians had for the first time since 1945 a united leadership with a clear political programme. Rugova held out hope that the conflict could be resolved by negotiation with the Serbs. He urged his fellow-Albanians not to give Serbia a pretext for carrying

out a campaign of ethnic cleansing, maintaining that Milosevic's policy was doomed to failure and that time was on the side of the Albanians.

Nevertheless, despite his popularity, Rugova came under attack by some activists who maintained that his peaceful approach was futile and who called for the creation of a system of self-defense against Serbia¹⁵. As the conflict between Belgrade and Zagreb intensified, Croatian emissaries reportedly urged the Albanians to stage an uprising. However, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had alienated the Albanians by accepting Milosevic's plan to exclude them from talks on the future of Yugoslavia and by publicly declaring that Kosova was Serbia's internal affair.

Kosova and the Democratisation of Albania

The development of political pluralism in Kosova had a direct and immediate bearing on domestic developments in Albania. After the violent overthrow of the Ceausescu regime in Romania, Albania had remained the last communist state in East Europe, with the notable exception of Serbia. The emergence of noncommunist political parties in Kosova stimulated demands for political pluralism in Albania. Serbian repression in Kosova also increased pressure on the Tirana government to rescue the hard-pressed Kosovars. In an article published in September 1990, Sali Berisha, who was later to organise Albania's first opposition party, deplored the slow rate of change that the democratisation of Albania would represent "a valuable contribution to the struggle of our brothers in Kosova"¹⁶. Ramiz Alia's communist regime took a paradoxical stand, both supporting groups that had emerged in Kosova and rejecting calls to permit the establishment of opposition parties in Albania.

The ethnic Albanians had been overwhelmingly sympathetic to Enver Hoxha's regime. Although both Hoxha and his successor had provided only rhetorical support for Kosova, ethnic Albanians had maintained a conspicuous silence over reports of widespread human rights violations and the disastrous failures of the policies of Albania's communist regime. It was only in late 1990 that the Kosovars, disappointed at Tirana's failure to do more to spread international awareness of the Albanian problem and aware of Albania's poor international image, began to adopt a more critical stand toward their mother country. Some Kosovar intellectuals, who in the past had avoided criticising the Tirana regime, now publicly urged democracy for Albania. The prominent academician Rexhep Qosja appealed to Alia to pave the way for a multiparty system. Albania, he insisted, must become democratic not only for the sake of its own citizens but also for the sake of Kosova. Echoing Berisha's idea, Qosja added, "Only a democratic Albania can help Kosova... The longer [the democratisation of Albania] is delayed, the longer our suffering under Serbia will last"¹⁷. Other prominent Kosovars took a similar stand.

In its first public pronouncement, the Democratic Party called for the union of Kosova with Albania "within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe". Berisha denounced Serbian repression of the Kosovars and added that he could not accept that the division of the Albanian nation was permanent. Berisha stated that his party "will struggle by peaceful means and within the context of the processes of integration in Europe to realise [the Albanians'] rights to progress and national unity".

Evolving Ethnic Albanian Demands

Whereas the Albanians had pushed for greater political autonomy from the very inception of socialist Yugoslavia, they had not considered secession a practical option before the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. While various ethnic Albanian political groups and organisations had emerged as early as the 1950s and 1960s, there was no strong Albanian irredentist movement. Nor did Albania's communist regime encourage irredentism in Kosova.

As far back as World War II, Kosova had been a divisive issue between communists and nationalists in Albania, when the former had maintained that Kosova's future should be decided after the war, while the latter insisted it remain part of Albania. Hoxha's regime never claimed Kosova and indeed went to great pains to minimise the impact of recurring unrest in Kosova on relations between Tirana and Belgrade. Even at critical periods such as during Rankovic's repressions in the 1950s and the brutal suppression of Albanian demonstrations in 1968, 1981, and 1989-1990, the Albanian communist government did not take any concrete action in support of the Kosovars, confining itself to anti-Yugoslav diatribes.

Even after Milosevic's abolition of Kosova's autonomy in 1989, ethnic Albanian leaders, while contesting the legitimacy of Serbia's sovereignty, insisted that the problem of Kosova be resolved within the framework of a Yugoslav federation of internal as well as external borders. Kosovar leaders not only did not advocate union with Albania but did not even demand the attachment to Kosova of Albanian areas of Macedonia and Montenegro.

A Unified Stand

However, the failure of the Yugoslav republican leaders to negotiate the future of their country and the outbreak of hostilities between Serbia and Slovenia and Croatia forced even mainstream Albanian politicians to reassess their stand. In August 1991, Albanian political parties in Kosova, Macedonia, and Montenegro established a joint committee under Rugova's chairmanship to coordinate their activities and to take a unified stand. In a national referendum held in late September, the Albanians overwhelmingly approved the Kosova parliament's decision, at a clandestine meeting, to proclaim Kosova a "sovereign and independent state". On 11 October, the Coordinating Committee of Albanian Political Parties issued a statement explaining ethnic Albanian demands¹⁸. The document stated that, should agreement be reached to preserve the federal structure of Yugoslavia, Kosova must be recognised as a republic and the Albanian minorities in Macedonia, Montenegro, and southern Serbia guaranteed their national rights. In the event that Yugoslavia was preserved but its internal borders were changed, the Albanian inhabited territories in Macedonia, Montenegro, and southern Serbia were to be attached to the Republic of Kosova. If Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, then ethnic Albanians would insist on union with Albania. The statement made clear that the Albanians would not agree to remain in a rump Yugoslavia. Even at this late stage and despite the fact that they were excluded from negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia, the Albanians were still hopeful of a solution within a Yugoslav framework. It was only after the evaporation of all hope for an agreement on the preservation of Yugoslavia that the Albanians

chose separation from Serbia and appealed to the European Community for the recognition of Kosova's independence.

By the beginning of 1992, Serbia had created an apartheid system in Kosova and contacts between the two ethnic groups had been almost totally severed. Despite the occupation of the region by the police and the army, the Albanians organised the first multiparty elections in Kosova on 24 May 1992. Rugova, the only candidate, was elected president of the Republic of Kosova. The LDK won 96 seats in the 140-seat parliament. The Parliamentary Party won 13 seats, the Peasant Party and Christian Democratic Party seven seats each, the Party of Democratic Action one seat, and independent candidates two seats. Although local Serbs and Montenegrins boycotted the elections, which Serbia considered illegal, the ethnic Albanians reserved 14 seats for them¹⁹.

While Rugova and his LDK already enjoyed widespread support, the elections provided them with the legitimacy to establish what in fact amounts to a state within a state. The Serbian authorities have prevented the new Kosova parliament from holding public sessions, but have been unable to frustrate Rugova's plans to establish parallel institutions, including a shadow government, which are meeting the basic needs of ethnic Albanian society. Rugova's close associate Bujar Bukoshi was nominated prime minister by the Kosova parliament in October 1991. He has since lived in exile, but has effectively presented the Albanian case in the international arena. Bukoshi's government has also established a solidarity fund, financed primarily by the diaspora and private entrepreneurs in Kosova, which has provided assistance to the most needy. Private schools and clinics have been opened throughout Kosova. In addition, affluent Albanians in Macedonia, Western Europe, and the United States have sponsored individual Kosovar families, providing them with material assistance. However, the miserable economic situation is fuelling tensions and could provide ammunition for demagogues who prey upon the despair of the masses.

Growing Self-Confidence

Kosovar leaders, evidently having accepted Serbian repression as part of along process of gaining independence from Belgrade, have concentrated on developing Albanian institutions and bolstering self-confidence.

While some less influential Kosovar politicians have held meetings with the Serbian opposition, there has apparently been no contact between Rugova and the Serbian Government or opposition. Rugova did twice meet former Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic (at the London Conference on Yugoslavia in August 1992 and in Prishtina in October 1992), but their talks were inconclusive. Because of Milosevic's opposition, Panic could not keep promises to lift martial law and open the schools. Meanwhile, Serbia has refused to recognise Rugova as the legitimate representative of the ethnic Albanians.

Rugova has repeatedly expressed his readiness to open unconditional talks with the Serbian side. Prime Minister Bukoshi has unveiled a tenpoint plan calling of a no-fly zone over Kosova, the reopening of Prishtina University and all schools, a free press, and the reinstatement in their jobs of more than 100 000 dismissed Albanian workers²⁰. Rugova has suggested the creation of an independent but neutral Kosova state that would be demilitarised and would develop.

close links with both Serbia and Albania. The Serbs would enjoy the same status of a nation as the Albanian majority, and Serbian cultural shrines would be placed under international protection²¹.

Active Resistance Advocated

In contrast to Rugova's moderate stand that is evidently still supported by the overwhelming majority of the Kosovars, Rexhep Qosja, Kosova's preeminent scholar who has refused to be associated with any particular political party, has emerged as the spokesman of a segment of the Kosovar population that has concluded that the ways of the Albanians and Serbs have to part. Qosja has publicly chastised Rugova for allegedly leading the Albanian down a blind alley with his insistence on peaceful resistance. A vocal opponent of Serbia since the early 1980s, Qosja has accused Kosovar politicians of betraying Albanian national interests and has even suggested that the current political leaders should be replaced if they fail to insist on respect for the ethnic Albanians' right to self-determination. He maintains that ethnic Albanians cannot accept the status of second-class citizens and sees unification with Albania as the only acceptable solution to the Albanian question. Qosja has advocated active forms of resistance and civil disobedience, including massive street demonstration, short of outright war. He has proposed to hold a pan-Albanian convention to adopt a national strategy for the unification with Albania of all the Albanian-inhabited territories in the former Yugoslavia²².

1. "Novi Vjesnik", Zagreb, 24 November 1992, p.2, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Europe, Washington D.C., hereafter FBIS - EEU, 92-238, December 10, 1992, p.47.

2. The systematic violation of the rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosova has been thoroughly documented by independent international human rights organisations. See Helsinki Watch, *Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992* (New York, October 1992); *The Committee on International-Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Kosovo Crisis and Human Rights in Yugoslavia* (New York, February 1991); *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Dismissals and Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo* (Brussels, October 1992). See also Alush A. Gashi, ed., *The Denial of the Human and National Rights of the Albanians in Kosova* (New York, Illyria Publishing Co. Inc., 1991). Gashi, a member of the Prishtina-based Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, was dismissed in 1990 from his post as dean of the Medical Faculty of Prishtina University.

3. *Albania Seeks Tie to NATO, and Protection*, "The New York Times", December 17, 1992, p.A22.

4. DPP in German 0733 GMT, December 11, 1992, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: West Europe, Washington D.C., hereafter FBIS-WEU, 92-239, December 11, 1992, p.1.

5. David Binder, *Bush Warns Serbs Not To Widen War*, "The New York Times", December 28, 1992, p.A6.

6. See Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Elez Biberaj, *The Albanian Problem in* 169

Yugoslavia: Two Views, "Conflict Studies", No. 137/138 (1982).

7. Helsinki Watch, *Human Rights in a Dissolving Yugoslavia*, New York, January 1990, p.4.

8. See Elez Biberaj, *Yugoslavia: A Continuing Crisis?*, "Conflict Studies", No.225, October 1989, pp.8-10.

9. There were reports of Serbian police using indiscriminate and deadly force against peaceful demonstrators and preying on defenceless Albanian residents. See Helsinki Watch, *Human Rights in a Dissolving Yugoslavia*, pp.9-10.

10. A Prishtina-based association that keeps track of emigration from Kosova claims that since 1981 nearly 500 000 Albanians have left the regions for political and economic reasons. Albanian Telegraphic Agency (ATA) in English, Tirana, 0907 GMT, 9 August 1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-154, 10 August 1992, p.44. See also Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, Knocking on Europe's Conscience: Kosova, Evidence and Documents, Prishtina, 1992; and Gazmend Pula and Ekrem Beqiri, *Kosova: Colonial Oppression of Albanians in Yugoslavia*, "Kosova Watch", Prishtina, Kosova Helsinki Committee. Vol.1, No.1, 1992, pp.7-15.

11. "Rilindja", Prishtina, July 3, 1990, pp.1-4.

12. "Fjala", Prishtina, No.16, August 1990, p.8.

13. Zenun Celaj, *Kosova Proclaimed a Republic Within the Framework of Yugoslavia*, "Zëri i Rinisë", Prishtina, September 14, 1990, pp.7-9.

14. For Celaj's personal account of his imprisonment, see his article, *I Was Not Alone*, "Koha", November 8, 1990, p.10.

15. See Mehmet Kraja, *Why Is the LDK Criticised?*, "Fjala", No.21, October 1990, p.3; Ibrahim Berisha, *The Albanians Do Not Recognise Gandhi*, "Fjala", No.22, October 1990, p.3; "Kosovarja", January 1991, pp.17-18; and "Bota e Re", Prishtina, January 1, 1991, pp.8-9.

16. Sali Berisha, *Democracy and Humanism; An Inseparable Pair*, "Bashkimi", September 17, 1990, pp.2-3.

17. "Zëri i Rinisë", 2 November 1990, p.14. See also Qosja's statement in "Kosovarja", Prishtina, December 1990, p.2.

18. Patrick Moore, *The Albanian Question in the Former Yugoslavia*, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.1, No.14, 3 April 1992, pp.7-15.

19. Radio-Tirana Network in Albanian 1730 GMT, June 7, 1992, trans. in FBIS-EEU-92-110, June 8, 1992, p.57.

20. Bujar Bukoshi, *Serbia's Next Victim*, "The Washington Post", November 28, 1992, p.A23.

21. LDK Information Centre, Informatori Ditor (Daily Report), Prishtina, No.316, January 9, 1993, pp.1-2.

22. Rexhep Qosja, *Strategjia e Bashkimit Kombëtar* (The Strategy of National Unification), Prishtina, Albanological Institute, 1992.